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We estimate how trade openness affects the relationship between wages, labour productivity 
and foreign wages using sector-level time series for several EU member states. In some 
countries wages became less responsive to foreign wages as trade costs declined. We show 
this counter-intuitive result is as expected when wages are set by a monopoly union with a 
preference for wages relative to employment. Trade liberalisation then leads to more wage 
discipline by forcing unions to set wages more in line with labour productivity. Foreign wages 
simultaneously become less relevant. Our results call to rethink how trade liberalisation is 
affecting unionized labour markets, and offer a possible explanation for the mixed evidence 
found by some tests for international factor price convergence. 
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paper. 1 Introduction
The European Union has become increasingly economically integrated over
the last decades. Vast improvements in transport infrastructure, streamlining
of legislation and reforms such as the creation of a single market and currency
have greatly facilitated trading with other member states. Firms have become
more footloose and many ﬁrms have set up or relocated some production
and sales plants abroad. The integration process has manifested itself in a
signiﬁcant increase in intra-EU trade and FDI relative to GDP.
The process of trade liberalisation has been welcomed by many, but has equally
been perceived as increasing the exposure of local workers to foreign competi-
tion. As such economic integration would pose a threat to the labour market
position of workers, both in terms of wages and employment opportunities.
The economic literature has analysed the possible eﬀects of trade liberalisa-
tion on employment and wages in a wide variety of settings. It is not our aim
to summarise this literature here as excellent surveys can be found in, for ex-
ample, Hoekman and Winters (2005) and Feenstra and Hanson (2004). Our
paper builds on two strands of this literature which we want to single out.
Many studies test for factor price equalisation or convergence, one of the key
predictions of the classic Heckscher-Ohlin model of international trade (see
Leamer, 1995, for a discussion). For the EU, Tovias (1982), Gremmen (1985)
and Webber and White (2003) ﬁnd mixed results on whether European eco-
nomic integration has contributed to wage convergence. Burgman and Geppert
(1993) test whether wages in diﬀerent EU countries are co-integrated. Our ap-
proach is related to the factor price convergence literature in that we develop
a measure of trade integration and investigate whether trade integration has
strengthened the link between wages in diﬀerent countries. The dependency
of wages on the foreign wage level does not have to be driven by market
forces alone, however. In Belgium, for example, the government responded to
increasing international competition and the deteriorating relative cost com-
petitiveness of the country by setting a maximum yearly wage increase for
sectoral wage negotiations as an explicit function of the wage evolution in
neighbouring countries. In a similar vein the monopoly union in the small
theoretical model we set up rationally adjust its wage demands in function
of the foreign wage level in order to preserve employment. More wage disci-
pline abroad then leads to more local wage discipline and trade integration is
intuitively expected to strengthen the international interdependency of wages.
In a diﬀerent branch of literature with early contributions from for example
Grossman (1987) and Revenga (1992) the eﬀect of import competition on
wages and employment is analysed. Market rigidities and unionisation play
an important role in the analysis of the eﬀects of trade on labour markets.
2Macpherson and Stewart (1990) estimated the eﬀect of import penetration on
the diﬀerence between union and non-union wages. Boulhol et al. (2007) con-
sider the eﬀect of import penetration on union bargaining power. Abowd and
Lemieux (1990) consider employment and wage eﬀects of imports and exports
on unionised labour markets. Fontagn´ e and Mirza (2007) look at export mar-
ket shares. Unlike most of these studies we aim to investigate the overall eﬀect
of trade openness on employment and wages without diﬀerentiating between
imports and exports. Our approach is more related to Mezzetti and Dinopou-
los (1991) and related papers, where trade liberalisation limits the scope for
union wage demands by improving the relocation possibilities of ﬁrms. In this
context trade openness is expected to induce wage discipline by decreasing the
union wage gap, bringing wages more in line with labour productivity.
In section 2 we set up a simple model to analyse these two disciplinary ef-
fects of trade on a unionised labour market. We start by deriving the optimal
wage demand of a monopoly union operating on the sector level while facing
internationally mobile ﬁrms. Trade liberalisation makes ﬁrms more footloose,
which increases the cost of raising wages above the value of the marginal prod-
uct of labour in terms of lost employment. Lower trade costs then imply lower
wages. Wages become more sensitive to either local labour productivity or the
foreign wage level as trade costs decline, depending on the union preference
for wages relative to employment. Using minimal assumptions we derive fol-
lowing predictions (1) if unions prefer wages over employment, wages are unit
elastic with respect to foreign wages and inelastic with respect to local labour
productivity in autarky; (2) if trade is liberalised the sensitivity of wages with
respect to labour productivity increases and the sensitivity to foreign wages
decreases; (3) if unions are employment oriented, the opposite holds.
These predictions are shown to hold empirically in section 3, using the exten-
sive EUKLEMS and CEPII Trade and Production datasets. We proceed in
three steps. Firstly, we calculate country-sector speciﬁc intra-EU trade costs
using bilateral sector-level trade data. The results conﬁrm that the last two
decades of the previous century were characterised by a signiﬁcant decline in
intra-EU trade costs. Secondly, we show that the employment cost of increas-
ing wages has been increased by trade liberalisation. Thirdly, we show that,
on average, trade liberalisation lead to more wage discipline in the form of
wages moving more in line with labour productivity, and not -after controlling
for labour productivity- with an increased responsiveness to foreign wages.
Our results suggest that on average unions give more weight to wages relative
to employment in the EU. Large diﬀerences between countries and sectors ex-
ist, however, indicating that unions in countries such as Germany care more
about employment compared to their Southern-European counterparts. Mea-
suring the wage orientation of unions by the existence of a statutory minimum
wage and the variability of wages over the business-cycle relative to employ-
3ment, we conﬁrm that in countries with wage-oriented unions trade liberalisa-
tion leads to more wage discipline by bringing wages more in line with labour
productivity, and not through strengthening the link with the foreign wage
level. In countries with employment oriented unions the reverse holds.
These results call to rethink the labour market eﬀects of trade liberalisation.
They also oﬀer an explanation for the mixed results of tests for factor price
equalisation or factor price convergence which are based on directly investigat-
ing the relationship between wages in diﬀerent countries (as in, for example,
Burgman and Geppert, 1993; Jung and Doroodian, 2000; Andersen et al.,
2000; Berger and Westermann, 2001), and raise doubts about the validity of
such tests. Wages might converge internationally but simultaneously become
less interdependent.
2 Union wage demands with internationally mobile ﬁrms
2.1 Homogeneous union preferences
Consider a monopoly union acting on the sector level, unilaterally setting
wages h as to maximise a homogeneous utility function U(h,f,a), where f is
the level of foreign wages and a is the wage level in some large non-unionised
sector of the economy, equal to the value of the marginal product of labour.
Examples of such functions U are given later on.





The implicit function theorem can be used to analyse how the union wage
demand changes in function of model parameters. Expressing changes in the




































If U is homogeneous of degree r, F must be homogeneous of degree r −1. By









a = (r − 1)F = 0.
4Dividing by ∂F





a = 1. (1)

















The eﬀect of any model parameter on ￿h
f and ￿h
a must therefore be opposite.
Following proposition summarises these results.
Proposition 1 If union preferences are homogeneous in home wages h, for-
eign wages f and the alternative wage a, the elasticities of union wages with
respect to f and a must sum to one. As a result the eﬀect of model parameters
on these elasticities must be opposite.
To derive more properties of the union wage we quantify union utility U. As-
sume the union operates on the sector level and has a preference for both
aggregate employment nL (with n the number of active ﬁrms in the sector
and L the labour demand of a typical ﬁrm), and for the diﬀerence between
wages and the wage in a non-unionised sector of the economy (h−a). Workers
are assumed to be internationally immobile and gauge wage demands against
the alternative of employment in the local non-unionised sector. The union
maximises a weighted product of aggregate employment and the wage diﬀer-
ence:
U = n(h,f)L(h)(h − a)
γ, (2)
where γ > 0 is the weight of the wage diﬀerence relative to employment. 2
If γ > 1 unions are wage oriented. This is a standard speciﬁcation for union
utility (see for example Layard et al., 2005), apart from the fact aggregate
labour demand depends on the foreign wage level and trade costs through
their eﬀect on the number of ﬁrms n in a country.
When the union demands higher wages, ﬁrms hire less labour and some ﬁrms
relocate (decreasing n, the number of active ﬁrms in the sector). 3 For labour
demand we assume L(h) = h−￿, where −￿ < 0 is the elasticity of labour
demand. As for the number n of active ﬁrms we impose that only relative
wages h/f matter to ﬁrm location. It can easily be veriﬁed that under these
assumptions following proposition holds.
2 The empirical literature suggests γ < 1, given the regularity that wages vary less
than employment over time. Pehkonen (1990) gives an estimate of γ ≈ 0.2, with
employment entering linearly in union preferences as in our speciﬁcation.
3 Note that we could assume capital rather than physical ﬁrms relocate, as in
Martin and Rogers (1995).
5Proposition 2 Union utility functions of the form U = n(h/f)h−￿(h − a)γ
are homogeneous of degree γ − ￿ in h, f and a.
A wide variety of models from the economic geography literature could serve
to describe the number of ﬁrms n which locate in a country. This typically
requires assumptions on consumer preferences, ﬁrm pricing behaviour, etc.
Not all of these models will be characterised by n depending only on the ratio
of wages. Allowing for international wage diﬀerences in the footloose capital




m(1 − φ2) + φ2 − φh/f
(φ − h/f)(φh/f − 1)
,
where m is the appropriately normalised market size of the country and φ is
a measure of the freeness of trade which is decreasing in transport costs. Only
relative wages matter to ﬁrm location, union utility therefore is homogeneous
of degree γ−￿ and the properties of union wages derived above therefore hold
for this speciﬁcation of n.
As the derivations become lengthy and un-insightful using this theoretically
underpinned speciﬁcation for n, we use following ad-hoc deﬁnition for the
remainder of this paper




In autarky (φ = 0), or in the absence of an international wage diﬀerential
(h = f) the number of ﬁrms equals the (appropriately normalised) market
size m. As trade becomes freer (a higher φ), the international wage diﬀerential
becomes more relevant to ﬁrm location. The results obtained from this model
are qualitatively similar as those obtained using the extended model of Martin
and Rogers (1995).
2.2 The eﬀect of labour productivity, foreign wages and trade costs on union
wage demands
Given the union preferences from equation (2) the ﬁrst order condition for the
optimal union wage demand can be written as






where we write ￿n
h for the elasticity of n with respect to wages h, and ￿L
h is the
wage elasticity of ﬁrm level labour demand.
6Assuming L(h) = h−1 and using the simple speciﬁcation for ﬁrm location from




a/dφ can be derived.
The optimal union wage demand is
h =
(γ − 1)(φ + m)f +
q
(γ − 1)2(φ + m)2f2 + 4φγ(φ + m)af
2φγ
. (5)
Union wage demands are increasing in the alternative wage a, the home market
size m, foreign wages f and the weight of wages in union preferences γ. Wage
demands decrease as trade becomes freer as measured by φ.









f(φ + m)(γ − 1)
2
q
f(φ + m)(γ − 1)2 + 4φγa
. (6)
If unions care just as much about wages and employment (γ = 1) and trade
costs are not prohibitively high (φ > 0) we have ￿h
f = ￿h
a = 1/2. Union wage
demands then are equally sensitive to changes in foreign wages and changes
in the alternative wage. If unions are biased toward wages (γ > 1), we have
￿h
f > 1/2 and ￿h
a < 1/2, and vice-versa for γ < 1. The results for ￿h
a follow
directly from equation (1) or proposition 1.
Our main interest lies with the question how the sensitivity of the optimal
union wage demand with respect to its determinants changes in function of
trade costs. The eﬀect of φ on ￿h









φ + m((φ + m)f(γ − 1)2 + 4φγa)
3/2.
As the expression is positive for γ > 1 and negative for γ < 1, freer trade
decreases or increases the sensitivity of union wages to foreign wages depending
on whether unions are wage or employment oriented, respectively.
















1 if γ > 1,
0 if γ < 0.
(7)
In autarky union wages are unit elastic with respect to foreign wages in the case
where unions prefer wages over employment, and are completely insensitive to
the foreign wage level in the case unions are employment oriented.
Figure 1 illustrates the results on the eﬀect of φ on wages (solid line), the
sensitivity to foreign wage changes as expressed by ￿h
f (dashed line) and the
7sensitivity of wages with respect to local labour productivity ￿h
a (dotted line).
The left panel shows the case of an employment oriented union (γ = 0.8), the


























Fig. 1. The eﬀect of φ on wages (solid line), the sensitivity of wages to productivity
(dotted line) and the sensitivity to foreign wages (dashed line). In the left panel
unions weigh employment more than wages and vice versa in the right panel.
right panel the case of strong union preferences for wages (γ = 1.5). As the
case γ = 0.8 is close to an equal weight of wages and employment (γ = 1),
both elasticities are close to 1/2 unless trade costs are high (see equation (6)).
It might appear counter-intuitive that there exist conﬁgurations in which
wages are more sensitive to the foreign wage level in a more closed economy.
Some intuition on the eﬀect of trade costs on the sensitivity of union wage
demands with respect to foreign wages and productivity can be gained by con-
sidering the structure of the union utility function and ﬁrst order condition in
the extreme case of an economy close to autarky.
First consider the case of a wage oriented union (γ > 1). In this case the term
−￿L
h − γ in the denominator of the expression for the union wage demand in
equation (4) is small. If transport costs are high, the number of ﬁrms in a
country is relatively insensitive to relative wages (−￿n
h is small, see equation
(3)) and the union increases its wage demands far above the outside-option
wage a. Wages become less related to the alternative wage and, by proposition
1, they become more sensitive to foreign wages.
The properties can also be understood from the structure of union utility
U = n(h,f)L(h)(h − a)γ, and the assumed ﬁrm behaviour. If unions prefer
wages to employment, high union wage demands will induce ﬁrms to relocate
and local ﬁrms will reduce their workforce, leading to a low level of aggregate
labour demand n(h,f)L(h), relative to (h−a)γ. Small changes in productivity
then do not greatly aﬀect union utility. A small decrease in the foreign wage
level, in contrast, leads to a further decrease in the already small base of ﬁrms,
8greatly aﬀecting total utility, and therefore leading to large adjustments of
the optimal union wage demand in an attempt to preserve employment. Wage
oriented unions make use of the closedness of the economy to inﬂate wage
demands, but they skate on thin ice: small changes in foreign wages greatly
aﬀect union utility by causing small changes in the international distribution
of ﬁrms, thus requiring large adjustment in the optimal union wage demand.
If unions attach more weight to employment (γ < 1), the term −￿L
h − γ
in equation (4) remains positive even as −￿n
h approaches zero for very high
trade costs. Wage demands remain limited and foreign wages (which enter
the expression for the union wage demand only through −￿n
h) then become
irrelevant altogether to union wage demands when φ ≈ 0.
Following proposition summarises these results
Proposition 3 If unions are wage (employment) oriented, wages are unit
(in-) elastic with respect to foreign wages in autarky, and in- (unit) elastic
with respect to the alternative wage. Wages become less (more) sensitive to
the level of foreign wages after trade liberalisation, and more (less) sensitive
to the alternative wage.
The eﬀect of trade on the sensitivity of union wages with respect to the alter-
native wage (labour productivity) follow directly from proposition 1.
We do not claim the chosen framework is unique in making some of these
predictions. Consider the case, for example, where unions set employment as
well as wages. Labour demand L in equation (2) then is assumed ﬁxed when





γ(φ + m)f + φa
, ￿
h






(γ(φ + m)f + φa)2 < 0.
And the same results as in the case of a wage biased union therefore hold.
3 Empirical Framework
In this section some of the predictions of the small model from the previous
section are tested using aggregate data on 12 industries in 13 EU-countries for
the years 1980-2001. We proceed in three steps. Firstly, bilateral sector-level
intra-EU trade data is used to show that intra-EU trade costs have signiﬁcantly
declined over the last decades. Secondly, we argue that aggregate employment
has become more sensitive to international relative wage cost diﬀerentials in
those sectors and countries which experienced the largest drop in trade costs.
Thirdly, it is shown that the sensitivity of wages with respect to changes in
9local labour productivity and the wage level in neighbouring countries has
changed as trade was liberalised. There exist important diﬀerences between
member states.
Sectoral data on employment, wages and productivity was taken from the EU-
KLEMS database (see Timmer et al., 2007). Market access and trade costs
were calculated using the CEPII trade and production dataset assembled by
Mayer et al. (2008). The sectors used are 12 2-digit NACE manufacturing
sectors, except for the sectors 17-18, 21-22, 27-28, 30-33, and 34-35 which had
to be aggregated due to data limitations. Sectors 23 (coke, reﬁned petroleum
products and nuclear fuel) and 16 (manufacture of tobacco products) were ex-
cluded. We use data from all EU15 member states, excluding Luxembourg and
Greece for which insuﬃcient trade data was available. 4 As we require com-
plete series the time-frame had to be limited to the years 1980-2001 and some
country/sector combinations are not included (see table 8 in the appendix for
a list of sectors and countries included in the sample). Throughout, although
our theoretical predictions pertain to sector-level union wages, we consider sec-
tor level data which will be comprised of unionised and non-unionised ﬁrms
and sub-sectors. We believe this is justiﬁed in that most sectors are unionised
to a certain degree in the EU, and contracts in non-unionised ﬁrms are of-
ten subject to conditions which have been established by union bargaining at
the sector level. Moreover, governments and other agents may in eﬀect mimic
the derived union behaviour (cfr. the example of Belgium given in the intro-
duction). Both the CEPII and EUKLEMS dataset are publicly available for
download. STATA code showing how the results in this section were obtained
are available from the author on request.
3.1 The evolution of intra-EU trade costs
In typical economic geography models with Dixit-Stiglitz monopolistic compe-
tition and CES demand, a parameter φ = τ1−σ is used to express the ‘freeness
of trade’. Here τ are iceberg transport costs (τ > 1 units of a good have to be
shipped to sell 1 unit at the destination) and σ > 1 is the familiar elasticity of
substitution between CES varieties. φ is decreasing in transport costs and is
bounded between 0 (autarky) and 1 (perfectly free trade). As shown by Head
and Mayer (2004) the trade freeness φnjit between countries n and j in sector
i and year t can be estimated under reasonable assumptions, using only trade






4 This leaves Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Ireland, Italy,
the Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, Sweden and the United Kingdom in the sample.
10where mnjit is the value of exports from n to j in sector i and year t and mnnit
is the value of country n’s production net of exports (which can be understood
as ‘exports to self’). In most studies the parameter φ is calculated bilaterally.
For our purposes, however, it proves more practical to treat all EU trading
partners of a country as a rest-of-the-world aggregate.
Figure 2 shows φ for a selection of EU member states, aggregating trade












































NOR FIN PRT ESP AUT IRL DNKSWE ITA GBR FRA GER NLD BEL
Fig. 2. The evolution of φ in some large EU member states (left) and a comparison
of levels in 1999 for all countries in the sample, plus Norway.
new member states such as Spain (joined 1986) show an impressive increase
in trade freeness, especially in relative terms. Clearly, long-time EU-member
states and countries located close to the EU economic core regions have higher
values of φ compared to more peripheral and non-member countries, such as
Norway which was added for comparison. 5 Large diﬀerences between sectors
are revealed when estimating φ on the sectoral level, with trade freeness rang-
ing from 0.016 for ‘publishing, printing and reproduction of recorded media’
to 0.28 for ‘machinery and equipment’. 6
Summarising, the trade data reveals both a signiﬁcant decrease in intra-EU
trade costs over the last two decades and the existence of substantial diﬀer-
ences in the level and evolution of intra-EU trade freeness between member
states and industries. This conﬁrms the European integration process can be
used as an interesting experiment to analyse the labour market eﬀects of eco-
nomic integration.
5 Note that for Finland, for example, trade with neighbouring countries such as
Russia is not considered. Our estimate of φ for peripheral countries would underes-
timate their openness with respect to the world as a whole, but rather serves as a
proxy for openness with respect to the EU15.
6 These numbers are for France in 1999.
113.2 Economic integration and the eﬀect of relative wages on aggregate em-
ployment
Log-linearising aggregate labour demand assuming L = h−￿ and using the
speciﬁcation for the number of ﬁrms in the country from equation (3) (while
ignoring the eﬀect of φ for now) suggests using following estimation equation
for sectoral labour demand in country k, sector i and year t
logLkitnkit = β0 + β1 log(hkit) + β2 log(hkit/fkit) + β3 log(mkit) + ￿kit. (8)
This speciﬁcation allows to diﬀerentiate between what might be called the
national and international eﬀect of wage changes. The coeﬃcient β1 measures
−￿, the eﬀect of a wage increase on ﬁrm level labour demand, keeping the
international wage diﬀerential h/f and thus the distribution of ﬁrms n ﬁxed.
A change in relative wages h/f for a given level of local wages, in contrast,
aﬀects only the number of ﬁrms n in a country but leaves the ﬁrm level labour
demand unaﬀected. The coeﬃcient β2 captures how a relative wage change
aﬀects aggregate labour demand through n, keeping local wages ﬁxed. The
coeﬃcient β3 corresponds to the eﬀect of an increase in the relative market
size of a country on its sectoral employment. In our simple model an increase
in m only increases the number of ﬁrms n in a country and leaves the typical
ﬁrm size unaﬀected. 7
The eﬀect of a change in the relative wage h/f is predicted to increase with
freer trade. Although the eﬀect of market size m on n is constant in our
simple model, most models of economic geography predict the eﬀect of market
size on the distribution of ﬁrms to increases with freer trade. We therefore
add interaction terms of the relative wage and market size with φ. Moreover,
although we abstracted from labour productivity in describing the location
choice of ﬁrms, in reality ﬁrms are likely to consider wages relative to labour
productivity when determining the total cost of production in a location. We
therefore add local labour productivity and relative labour productivity as
explanatory variables.
As the international distribution of ﬁrms and labour demand is likely to re-
spond slowly to changes in factor prices and short run adjustment might sig-
niﬁcantly diﬀer from the long-run dynamics we write the extended estimation
7 This is the case in the long run equilibrium of the footloose capital model of
Martin and Rogers (1995) as well, for example.
12equation (8) in an error-correction form:








+ αec lognkit−1Lkit−1 + αxkit−1 + α
0φkit−1xkit−1
+ νki + µt + ηkt + ￿kit,
where nL is measured as the aggregate sector-level total hours worked (log-
hours) and x is a vector of explanatory variables in logs containing real wages
logwage, wages relative to the foreign wage level logrelwage,labour productivity
loglp, relative labour productivity logrellp, a measure of market access logaccess
and the estimated trade freeness in levels φ. Foreign variables are calculated
treating all other countries as a rest-of-the-world aggregate. More details on
how these variables are deﬁned are available in the data appendix. The ξ
parameters correspond to the short run eﬀects. The parameters α estimate the
long-run relationship between the variables in levels, controlling for the short
run adjustments. They relate to equation (8) via, for example for the element
of α measuring the eﬀect of a change in the local wage h, β1 = −αh/αec. 8
The coeﬃcient αec measures the speed of adjustment toward the long-run
equilibrium. We add a country-sector speciﬁc constant (νki), time dummies
(µt) and allow for a country speciﬁc time trend by including ηkt. The ￿kit
capture residual error.
Table 1 shows the results of estimating the above error correction model by
OLS. The estimates of the long-run parameters are given separately in the
right panel of the table. In the remainder of the paper we will mostly imme-
diately report the long-run estimates.
An important aspect in estimating relationships between long-run time series
is the risk of spurious estimation results in case some of the variables are
non-stationary. After conﬁrming the existence of a unit root in the aggregate
employment, wages and labour productivity series, we tested the null of no-
cointegration using the residual-based panel cointegration test of Kao (1999)
and the test of Persyn and Westerlund (2008) which considers the speed and
signiﬁcance of the adjustment towards the long-run equilibrium relationship.
The results were mixed, with the Kao (1999) test strongly rejecting the null
of no-cointegration, while the Persyn and Westerlund (2008) test is not able
to reject the series are not cointegrated. 9
8 This can easily be veriﬁed by assuming all diﬀerenced variables equal zero in the
error-correction equation.
9 A possible cause might be the combination of a large number of covariates and
the short length of the series is weakening the power of the more structural test of



















































Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
Table 1 The eﬀect of cost competitiveness and market access on sectoral labour
demand.
Bearing in mind the mixed results from the cointegration tests, the results do
suggest the simple assumptions of our model hold: as trade freeness increases,
the attractiveness of a country in terms of its relative wage and productivity
becomes more important in explaining aggregate labour demand. There is
evidence of a home market eﬀect in that freer trade increases the eﬀect of
changes in the local market size on the aggregate labour demand.
from low power if the covariates in the error-correction equation are error-correcting
as well.
143.3 Economic integration and union wage demands
So far we have established empirically that trade costs have signiﬁcantly de-
clined. We also found that this is accompanied by an increase in the sensitivity
of aggregate of employment with respect to international diﬀerences in labour
costs, which oﬀers support for this assumption of our small model on the loca-
tion of economic activity. As we argued in our theoretical section, a monopoly
union should take ﬁrm mobility into account when setting wages. Our the-
oretical model makes clear predictions on the resulting relationship between
union wage demands, labour productivity and foreign wages, and how this
relationship changes after trade liberalisation. We estimate following relation-
ship, which derives directly from equation (5) or proposition 3.
loghkit = β0 + β1 log(akit) + β
0
1φkitlog(akit) + β2 log(fkit) + β
0
2φkitlog(fkit)
+ β3φkit + νki + µt + ηkt + ￿kit.
The predictions from theory are that if unions have strong preferences for
wages we should observe β1 = 0 and β2 = 1 as these coeﬃcients correspond to
autarky. The eﬀect of labour productivity on wages will then increase for freer
trade (β0
1 > 0) and foreign wages will become less relevant to the optimal union
wage demand (β0
2 < 0). In case unions have strong preferences for employment,
the opposite holds: β1 = 1, β2 = 0, β0
1 < 0 and β0
2 > 0.
Table 2 shows the results of estimating the above equation in an error cor-































Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
Table 2 The eﬀect of labour productivity, foreign wages and trade openness.
15Westerlund (2008) test strongly reject the null of no cointegration.
The results do not allow to draw a straightforward conclusion. On average,
trade liberalisation seems to have had a downward eﬀect on wages. The fact the
coeﬃcient on labour productivity is rather high compared to the low coeﬃcient
on the level of foreign wages suggests union preferences are biased toward
employment. The eﬀect of freer trade on the eﬀect of these variables, however,
suggests unions are wage oriented. An obvious cause for these mixed results
could be the fact union preferences are heterogeneous across EU member states
and sectors, and the above results would suﬀer from some aggregation bias.
3.3.1 Heterogeneous union preferences
To investigate whether the heterogeneity of union preferences is aﬀecting our
results, we split the sample in two groups of countries, depending on whether
they have a statutory minimum wage or not. Judging from the unemployment
levels in 1980 reported in table 7 (the ﬁrst year in our sample) in the appendix,
employment in countries with a statutory minimum wage bore a larger part
of the burden of the economic downturn in this period compared to countries
without a statutory minimum wage. If the presence of a statutory minimum
wage proxies for the relative union preference for wages relative to employ-
ment, we should observe diﬀerent coeﬃcients which are more in line with the
theoretical predictions in both groups.
The ﬁrst column of table 3 shows the long run coeﬃcients of the wage re-
gression for the UK, the Netherlands, France, Ireland, Portugal, Belgium and
Spain, which have a statutory minimum wage. These results contrast with
the second column, showing the results for Austria, Sweden, Germany, Fin-
land, Denmark and Italy. Splitting the sample shifts the coeﬃcients in the
expected direction. In the group of countries with a statutory minimum wage
the coeﬃcient on labour productivity is smaller compared to countries with-
out minimum wages, but remains large and signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero.
Similarly for the coeﬃcient on foreign wages: it is substantially larger com-
pared to countries without minimum wages, but is signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from
one. The eﬀect of freer trade is as predicted in both groups, except for the
eﬀect on the labour productivity elasticity in the group of countries without a
minimum wage, which is not signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero. In the minimum-
wage group the coeﬃcients on productivity and foreign wages are closer to 1/2
than their theoretically predicted values of 0 and 1.
A ﬁrst straightforward explanation for these observations is that the groups of
countries are still heterogeneous in terms of union preferences. We will attempt
to deal with this issue by introducing a better sector/country speciﬁc (rather
than just country speciﬁc) proxy for the union relative preference for wages
16Dependent variable: logwage
Statutory No statutory












Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
Table 3 The eﬀect of labour productivity, foreign wages and trade openness.
later on.
A second explanation is the fact it is diﬃcult to estimate the eﬀect for φ = 0
as this value is out-of-sample: no country or industry is completely isolated in
our dataset. For values of φ close to 0, but not exactly equal to φ, equation
(6) holds, and not equation (7). It are these values φ > 0 which we observe in
the data. Unless unions have extreme preferences, we expect elasticities closer
to 1/2 for these strictly positive values of φ.
Thirdly, as the predicted eﬀect of φ on the coeﬃcients is nonlinear, some
bias can be expected due to the linear approximation used in our estimation.
In fact, given the curvature in the predicted coeﬃcient on productivity and
foreign wages around φ = 0 (as shown in ﬁgure 1) we expect a linear approx-
imation to underestimate the true value close to φ = 0 when the predicted
coeﬃcient is 1, and expect an overestimate of the true value in case the pre-
dicted coeﬃcient is 0. 10 Adding interaction terms of labour productivity and
foreign wages with the squared freeness of trade allows to evaluate the direc-
tion and importance of these nonlinear eﬀects. Table 4 shows the results for the
full sample and both groups separately. Splitting the sample shifts the coeﬃ-
cients in the predicted direction for all coeﬃcients and considerably improves
the ﬁt. For countries without a statutory minimum wage, allowing for nonlin-
ear eﬀects makes the coeﬃcients on labour productivity and foreign wages in
autarky almost perfectly match the theoretical predictions. For countries with
10 Imagine drawing a line through a point cloud around the theoretically predicted
values of the elasticities in ﬁgure 1. Then consider where it would cross the Y-axis.
17Dependent variable: logwage
Full Statutory No statutory
sample minimum wage minimum wage
loglp 0.548∗∗∗ 0.433∗∗∗ 0.931∗∗∗
(0.0702) (0.109) (0.0913)
φloglp 2.725∗∗ 5.127∗∗∗ −4.773∗∗∗
(1.109) (1.681) (1.654)
φ2loglp −6.665∗ −14.45∗∗ 17.32∗∗∗
(3.882) (5.849) (5.559)
logwageEU 0.438∗∗∗ 0.722∗∗∗ −0.133
(0.137) (0.240) (0.133)
φlogwageEU −4.532∗∗ −9.273∗∗∗ 5.319∗∗
(1.837) (2.983) (2.097)
φ2logwageEU 11.69∗ 23.27∗∗ −14.83∗∗
(6.187) (10.40) (6.972)
φ −2.790 −6.223 4.003∗
(2.252) (3.878) (2.198)
φ2 6.972 13.25 −6.835
(7.161) (12.39) (6.916)
Observations 2594 1339 1255
Standard errors in parentheses ∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
Table 4 The nonlinear eﬀect of trade openness on the relationship between labour
productivity, foreign wages and union wages, separately for countries with and with-
out a statutory minimum wage (see table 7 in the data appendix).
a minimum wage those coeﬃcients are still rather close to 1/2, but are much
more in line with the predictions compared to the linear speciﬁcation.
To obtain groups which are more homogeneous with respect to union prefer-
ences and to illustrate the robustness of our results with respect to the chosen
proxy for the relative wage preference of unions, we repeat the split sample
analysis using the variability of wages relative to employment as a direct esti-
mate of the union preferences. As shown by Pehkonen (1990) wages vary more
than employment over the business cycle if unions are wage-oriented, and vice-
versa with employment oriented unions. As an estimate of the variability of
wages and employment, we take the standard deviation of the residuals of a
sector/country speciﬁc regression of both variables in logs on a constant and
linear time-trend. This provides us with a country/sector speciﬁc estimate of
the relative variability of wages. We then split the sample, assigning half of the
country/sector combinations to two groups according to their estimated union
wage preference. These two groups are rather heterogeneous in terms of the
countries and sectors included as can be seen in table 8 in the appendix, but
are designed to be more homogeneous with respect to the underlying union
18preferences. Figure 3 shows the sector/country combinations in our dataset the
highest (left panel) and lowest (right panel) variability of wages relative to em-

























Ireland, textiles and wearing apparel
Fig. 3. The sector/country combinations with the highest (left panel) and lowest
(right panel) variability of wages relative to employment
using this new proxy for union preferences is reported in the OLS columns
of table 5. Despite the substantial rearrangement of the composition of both
groups 11 the estimated coeﬃcients remain very much in line with the predic-
tions. The fact the standard error of the estimated coeﬃcients declines in all
cases strongly suggests both groups are more homogeneous regarding union
preferences compared to the case where we used the presence of a statutory
minimum wage as an indicator of a relatively wage-oriented union.
3.3.2 Endogenous regressors
The error-correction framework we have used so far is ﬂexible in allowing the
relationship between the variables in diﬀerences to diﬀer from the relationship
in levels, thus allowing the short and long run dynamics to diﬀer. Other pop-
ular techniques for estimating cointegration relationships, such as the panel
dynamic OLS (PDOLS) method of Mark and Sul (2003) typically restrict
short and long run dynamics to be identical (a common factor restriction).
An issue we have ignored so far is the possibility of weak exogeneity or en-
dogeneity of regressors, which would arise if the regressors themselves are
error-correcting, or if innovations in the regressors are correlated with leads
or lags of the error term in the error correction equation. Controlling for these
forms of endogeneity is an important goal of estimators such as Mark and Sul
(2003). Although we believe the risk of endogenous regressors is limited for
our speciﬁc application, we repeated the last split-sample regression with non-
linear eﬀects using the panel dynamic OLS estimator. The underlying idea of
11 The results are robust to excluding France and Belgium, for which all sectors
were assigned to the ‘high wage variability’ group and were also in the ‘statutory
minimum wage’ group.
19this method is to estimate the cointegration equation directly (imposing the
common factor restriction), augmenting it with leads and lags of the ﬁrst
diﬀerences of the dependent variable and all covariates, while allowing the
dependency on these additional variables to be speciﬁc to the cross-sectional
units (to control for endogeneity). This requires a large number of coeﬃcients
to be estimated, especially as in our case the number of covariates is rather
high and we have a maximum of only 21 observations per series. Including
the contemporaneous value, a single lag and a single lead of the diﬀerenced
dependent variable and all covariates (without interaction terms) requires the
estimation of 971 parameters in the high wage variability group, for example.
Table 5 shows the results using the PDOLS estimation remain in line with our
previous ﬁndings.
Dependent variable: logwage
High wage variability Low wage variability
OLS PDOLS OLS PDOLS
loglp 0.442∗∗∗ 0.331∗∗∗ 0.692∗∗∗ 0.759∗∗∗
(0.0980) (0.0505) (0.0933) (0.0536)
φloglp 6.403∗∗∗ 2.811∗∗∗ −3.865∗∗ −4.714∗∗∗
(1.534) (0.862) (1.670) (0.959)
φ2loglp −22.37∗∗∗ −4.982 20.83∗∗∗ 17.74∗∗∗
(5.676) (3.317) (5.714) (3.465)
logwageEU 0.828∗∗∗ 0.536∗∗∗ 0.0521 −0.138∗
(0.222) (0.103) (0.164) (0.0762)
φlogwageEU −12.49∗∗∗ −3.688∗∗ 3.154 4.537∗∗∗
(2.899) (1.706) (2.478) (1.252)
φ2logwageEU 41.10∗∗∗ 7.184 −13.91∗ −14.90∗∗∗
(10.64) (6.450) (7.791) (4.069)
φ −9.773∗∗∗ 0.0990 1.672 1.179
(3.717) (2.245) (2.710) (1.426)
φ2 31.94∗∗ −1.959 −1.938 −0.721
(12.46) (7.835) (8.333) (4.373)
Observations 1282 1282 1311 1311
Standard errors in parentheses ∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
Table 5 Separate estimation for countries and sectors depending on the cyclical
variability of wages relative to employment.
3.3.3 Quantifying the results
Our base regression shown in table 2 predicts a large increase of φ by 0.25 from
0.02 to 0.27 (which correspond to the 5th and 95th percentile of φ respectively)
implies a decrease in wages of about 29 percent as a direct eﬀect. In most
20speciﬁcations the estimated downward eﬀect was much larger in countries with
a statutory minimum wage (which we assumed have wage-oriented unions).
Trade freeness has a signiﬁcant eﬀect on the sensitivity of wages with respect
to labour productivity and foreign wages. Consider for example the PDOLS
estimation for wage oriented countries in table 5. The elasticity of wages with
respect to labour productivity changes from 0.38 to 0.73 when φ changes from
0.02 to 0.27. The foreign wage level becomes almost irrelevant as the estimated
elasticity drops from 0.47 to 0.06.
This paper has focused mainly on the wage eﬀects of trade integration. As for
the employment eﬀects, table 1 showed that, on average, trade liberalisation
is estimated to have had a negative impact on employment, but the eﬀect was
non-signiﬁcant. This contrasts to our simple union model, where trade liber-
alisation always implies more wage discipline and hence an increased demand
for labour.
We now repeat the estimation of aggregate labour demand, but now split
sectors and countries according to their estimated relative union preference
for wages. Table 6 shows that, as expected, the employment eﬀect of trade
has been overwhelmingly positive where unions are wage oriented, as trade
had the largest disciplining eﬀect on union wage demands in these countries
and sectors. For the employment oriented group, the results run contrary to
the predictions, but are not signiﬁcant.
4 Conclusion
In this paper we have attempted to shed light on how trade liberalisation
acts as a wage disciplining device. We started by assuming wages are set by a
monopoly union which takes into account the international mobility of produc-
tion. With some minimal assumptions on the structure of union preferences,
we are able to predict that as trade costs decline unions lower their wage de-
mands and -if unions care more about wages than employment- union wages
move more closely in line with labour productivity after trade liberalisation.
Foreign wages simultaneously become less relevant to the optimal union wage
demand.
We then showed these theoretical predictions are broadly supported by an
analysis of long sector-level time-series for a selection of EU member states.
We consider some extensions of the model which conﬁrm the validity of our
framework. Taking the existence of a statutory minimum wage and the relative
wage variability of wages relative to employment in a country as a proxy for
the relative union preference for wages relative to employment, the predictions
21Dependent variable: loghours





















Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
Table 6 Separate aggregate labour demand estimation for countries and sectors
depending on the cyclical variability of wages relative to employment.
of the model are conﬁrmed in a split-sample analysis. The predicted nonlinear
eﬀect of trade on the elasticity of wages with respect to labour productivity
and foreign wages is shown to be reﬂected in the data.
Our ﬁndings suggest a model where unions are setting wages while taking
into account the international mobility of production provides a reasonable
explanation of the behaviour of European wages during a period of intensive
trade liberalisation. The economic integration process has made the average
EU labour market more competitive in that wages move more in line with
labour productivity. The estimated direct negative eﬀect of freer trade on
wages is signiﬁcant in countries with wage oriented unions only. The eﬀect
trade has through changing the link between union wages and its determinants
proves at least as important.
Wages in countries with wage oriented unions converge toward the perfectly
competitive wage level after trade liberalisation. If technology is not too diﬀer-
22ent between countries, this implies wage convergence. Simultaneously wages
in these countries become less sensitive to foreign wages. This suggest that
investigating the relationship between wages in diﬀerent countries as a proof
for factor price convergence can be misleading.
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Data Appendix
Variable deﬁnitions
For Eurozone countries all nominal values were deﬂated using sector-country
level producer price deﬂators. For Sweden, the UK and Denmark the constant
local currency values where then converted to euros using a ﬁxed conversion
rate.
Wages are calculated as the total labour compensation per person engaged.
Labour productivity is calculated as the amount of real output per person
engaged.
24The foreign wage is calculated as a macro concept: for a country i the foreign
wage is the sum of total labour compensation in all other EU member states
in the sample, divided by the sum of the number of persons engaged in these
member states. This implies large countries have more weight in our measure
of foreign wages.
For the market size mnit we take the distance-weighted total demand for out-
put of sector i, from the perspective of country n, in year t. It proxies for


















Here drk is the geographic distance between regions r and k in countries n and
j respectively and popz is the population in region z. Data for ωnj and the
GDP were obtained from Mayer et al. (2008). Cjit is the total consumption
in country j of the output of the sector i in year t. This type of weighting
takes into account the distribution of demand among the regions bordering
the country of interest. Belgium, for example, would have a larger market
access than its GDP would suggest, as major industrialised and urbanised
regions such as Paris, the German Ruhr area and the Netherlands are in close
proximity.
Minimum wages, unemployment & wage orientation
Table 7 shows the unemployment rate of all countries included in the sample,
whether the country has a statutory minimum wage, and whether it is wage-
oriented in that most of its sectors show a relatively high variability of wages
over the business-cycle.
Table 8 shows which sector/country combinations were included in the sample.
Combinations indicated by a W show a relatively high variability of wages over














Table 7 Unemployment rates (in %) in 1980 (source: OECD). Countries with a
statutory minimum wage are indicated by a star. Countries with a majority of sec-
tors exhibiting large ﬂuctuations in wages as compared to employment are indicated
by †.
SectorAUTBELDNKESPFINFRAGBRGERIRLITANLDPRTSWETot.
15 E W W W E W W W W W W 11
17/18 E W E E E W E E E E W E 12
19 E E W E E W E 7
20 E W W E E W E E E W W W E 13
21/22 W W W E W W W E E E E W W 13
24 W W W W W W E W W W W E 12
25 W W E E W W E E W E E W E 13
26 E W E E E W E W W E W E E 13
27/28 W W W E E W E W W E W W E 13
29 E E E E W E E W W E 10
30-33 E E E W E E W W E 9
34/35 E E W E E W W E 8
Total 10 8 9 12 12 12 12 12 8 11 5 12 11 134
Table 8 Country/sector combinations included in the sample. E’s are included in
the employment oriented group, W’s in the wage oriented group.
26